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Log No. 59-8; Copy No. 09

THE UTILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF CIA S&TI PRODUCTS  
IN SUPPORT OF DOD MATERIEL ACQUISITION ☐

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Prepared by  
The Intelligence Community Staff  
for  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
AUG 1978

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ABSTRACT

(U) This report summarizes results of a study which examined utilization of CIA S&TI products by those who (a) define weapon requirements, (b) develop weapons, and (c) devise tactics and doctrine for weapon use. The report identifies management problems in the intelligence community and makes recommendations for improvement. An appendix describes in abbreviated form management techniques which would make the CIA S&TI program more useful to DoD. These techniques were developed during an earlier analytic effort which is a necessary antecedent to this study.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

1. (U) This document summarizes results of a study which examined the utility and accessibility of CIA scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) products for a large body of customers in DoD. The study had as its focus the needs of the materiel acquisition community--those at all levels who define requirements, develop weapon systems, and devise tactics and doctrine. An appendix to this report describes in outline form a system which could be used to enhance the value of the CIA S&TI program for DoD customers.

## INHIBITIONS TO USE OF CIA S&amp;TI

2. (U) The following summary sentences describe current problems inhibiting optimum use throughout DoD of CIA S&TI products. These are all problems of intelligence sharing.

- Many potential users in the DoD materiel acquisition community with a valid need for CIA S&TI products are unaware of the existence of the products, their nature, or how to obtain them.
- Only a select few users in the DoD materiel acquisition community are able to levy intelligence production requirements on CIA and evaluate resultant products.
- Producers of S&TI in DoD are unaware of scheduled CIA S&TI production in advance, making it impossible to avoid unneeded duplication.
- CIA does not make use of available documentation of DIA scheduled S&TI production to avoid undesirable redundancy.
- In general, CIA S&TI products are produced at classification levels which severely restrict distribution. In most cases it would be easily possible to produce a sanitized version for a wider readership.

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## SELECTED FINDINGS

3. (U) Among the findings documented in the main body of the report, the following are particularly pertinent to existing problems and recommended solutions:

- The CIA produces many excellent S&T intelligence products of great potential value to a wide body of users at all levels in the materiel acquisition community.
- CIA S&T intelligence is sufficiently valuable for DoD to merit special management attention in DIA and CIA to improved sharing, especially in production coordination and dissemination.
- CIA does not receive DoD S&TI requirements in a comprehensive or systematic manner. The S&TI needs of the DoD materiel acquisition community could be made known to CIA on an information basis without changing basic CIA missions or tasks.
- Based on the number of copies received, DoD is a principal consumer of CIA finished S&T intelligence products.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

4. (U) The following recommendations have two basic objectives, (a) to improve intelligence sharing of CIA S&TI production with the DoD materiel acquisition community and (b) to eliminate that portion of the duplication between CIA and DIA S&TI production which is undesirable.

- CIA should document its S&TI production in advance and make that documentation available to DIA.
- DIA should make the CIA S&TI documentation available to the materiel acquisition community.
- DIA should consolidate requests for CIA S&TI products, request needed copies from CIA, and make distribution.
- DIA should consolidate suggestions from DoD users regarding coverage and content of CIA S&TI publications for forwarding to CIA on an advisory or informational basis. Post-publication evaluations should be similarly handled.

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- CIA should make use of the DIA CAST (Catalog of Approved Scientific and Technical Intelligence Tasks) to derive maximum benefit from the DIA scheduled production program and to preclude unneeded duplication.
- CIA when possible should sanitize S&T publications which have been produced at the highest classification levels so that essential intelligence can reach a wider body of users.

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## I. PREFACE

### BACKGROUND

1.1 (U) The Intelligence Community Staff has reviewed existing arrangements for providing scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) to managers of Department of Defense (DoD) research and development (R&D) efforts. An initial study titled "Intelligence Community Support to Research and Development" was completed in October 1977. That study concentrated on problems within the Department of Defense and made recommendations for systematizing S&TI support to R&D within DoD. Those recommendations have been staffed within the intelligence community.

1.2 (U) Appendix A to this report presents in concise form the techniques for systematizing S&TI support to R&D that were developed in the earlier study. It shows that by involving the user, complete correlation can be made between the DoD S&TI and R&D programs. This precise correlation makes it possible for producers of S&TI to know who their users are in the R&D community. For their part the users of S&TI in the R&D community can know which scheduled S&TI products will be of value for each R&D effort down to the task level.

1.3 (U) Other important benefits resulting from the precise correlation of the DoD S&TI and R&D programs include: (a) identification by users of intelligence gaps and (b) evaluation by users of intelligence products. A user oriented system of S&TI support to R&D ensures that all intelligence products are based on needs of consumers.

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1.4 (U) In the course of the initial study it became apparent that (a) within DoD there is underutilization of CIA S&TI products and (b) DIA and CIA have no arrangements to prevent duplication of S&TI production. The severity of these problems was not determined.

**OBJECTIVE**

1.5 (U) The objective of this study effort is to examine the CIA S&TI production process to the degree necessary to confirm or deny earlier preliminary analyses regarding incomplete intelligence sharing. A second objective is to devise solutions for any management problems identified.

**APPROACH**

1.6 (U) To collect data for analysis, identify problems, develop findings and formulate recommendations, three related procedures were used:

- Interviews with senior officials of the CIA National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC)
- Review of Selected CIA S&TI products for a one-year period (1977)
- Discussions with potential customers for CIA S&TI products in all three services.

1.7 (U) Interviews in NFAC were for the purpose of becoming familiar with the organization, process, and programs for production of S&TI. Suggestions were sought on how to systematize use of CIA S&TI products by the DoD systems acquisition community.

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1.8 (U) The purpose of the review of CIA S&TI production for an entire year was to assess the potential value to users in Defense. Of particular interest was whether specific CIA publications were relevant to funded, documented DoD projects. Another objective was to assemble data concerning classification levels.

1.9 (U) An objective of discussions with a wide sampling of potential users of CIA S&TI products in DoD was to ascertain (a) if they had need of the products and (b) if they received them. The study team used data collected in this phase to identify problems such as distribution difficulties at the national or local level, classification impediments, or training deficiencies.

#### DEFINITION

1.10 (U) S&TI is officially defined by DoD as follows:

Scientific and Technical Intelligence--(DoD, IADB) The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information which covers: (a) foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and (b) scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and material, the research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for their manufacture. <sup>1/</sup>

1.11 (U) A comprehensive DIA definition of S&TI is:

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<sup>1/</sup> Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub. 1), The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 20301, 3 September 1974, pp. 289-90.

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- Scientific and Technical Intelligence....means foreign S&T intelligence and covers:
  - Developments in basic and applied sciences and technologies with warfare potential
  - Scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all weapon systems, sub-systems (sic) and associated material; research and development (R&D) related thereto; and the production methods employed for their manufacture
  - Overall weapon systems and equipment effectiveness. <sup>2/</sup>

1.12 (U) Since one of the aims of this study is to identify ways for better sharing of community S&TI in support of DoD materiel acquisition, any definition of S&TI used in this report should contain the essential elements of the foregoing versions. For purposes of this report those CIA S&TI products of interest are finished intelligence studies treating the present or future state of the art of foreign, military-related technology.

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<sup>2/</sup>

Scientific and Technical Intelligence Production (U), Defense Intelligence Agency Manual No. 75-1, Headquarters Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. 20301, 21 September 1977, p. 1.

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